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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
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METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
vs. 
ANNIE L. COLE 
RECORD No. 1474 
REPLY BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF IN ERROR 
The petition for writ of error, which is relied upon for 
plaintiff in error's opening brief, on page 8, cites the case 
of Swann vs. Atlantic Life Insurance Company, 156 Va. at 
852: 
The Swann case, supra, came again before this court· in 
1983, 160 Va. 125, and in the opinion by Justice Campbell it 
was said: 
" ( 1) Relying upon the former opinion, plaintiff con-
tends that the failure to furnish proof of insured's disability 
should not bar a recovery, for the reason that insured was 
incapable of engaging in any gainful occupation, and that 
the giving of notice and proof of disability was not a condi-
tion precedent to the right to a waiver of premiums. Fol-
lowed to its logical conclusion, plaintiff's argument would 
lead to the result that total and permanent disability which 
would prevent insured from engaging in; any gainful occu-
pation is equivalent to the insured's being mentally and 
physically incapable of furnishing pr~of or giving notice. 
"(2) The contention rests upon a misconception of the 
opinion. The court did hold : 'That the giving of notice and 
proof disability was not a condition precedent to the right 
to a waiver of premiums where the insured, through no 
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fault of his own, has become, while the policy is in force, 
mentally and physically incapable of. giving the notice or 
furnishing the proofs to the company, . * * * .' 
"The effect of that holding, however, was not to elim-
inate from the contract all provisions relative to the giving 
of notice or th~ furnishing of proof of the disability. The 
court was not dealing with such a disability as prevented 
the insured from engaging in a gainful occupation, but wa~ 
dealing with the issue raised by plaintiff's repucation that 
the insured was 'mentally and physically incapable of fur-
nishing proofs'." 
This question again came before the court September 
21, 1933,-Atlantic Life Ins. Co. vs. Fugate, 170 S. E. 573, 
Justice Hudgins referred to both of the above Swann cases 
and stated, at page 57 4: 
"Chief Justice Campbell, who wrote the opinion, dis-
cussing an instruction which told the jury that the plaintiff 
'must show by the preponderance of the evidence, that the 
insured was, during the entire time between the onset of 
his disability, if any, and his death, reasonably incapable 
of notifying the' company of his disability or of furnishing 
the company proof of such disability, said: 
" 'The insertion of the word "reasonably" in the instruc-
tion renders it erroneous. To be relieved of the necessity 
of giving notice or furnishing proof, the insured must be 
totally (either physically or mentally) incapacitated from 
acting in the matter'." 
The courts of other States have gone even further. For 
example: In Reynolds' Administrator vs. Trave-lers' Insur-
ance Company (Washington, Jan. 3, 1934), - .Pac. -, that 
court said: · 
"The general rule is firmly established that insanity or 
incapacitating sickness of the insured, because of which he 
fails to pay, when due, a premium or assessment on an in-
surance policy, will not excuse such failure so as to prevent 
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a forfeiture, termination or suspension of the rights of the 
insured, in a case where the policy provides for such for-
feiture in the event of non-payment of premium." 
(Many cases cited). 
"While, upon first thought, this rule may be considered 
harsh, it has very substantial reason to support it. Prompt 
payment of premiums is of the very: essence and substance 
of the contract, against which the courts may not grant 
relief. While sickness or insanity of the insured may ren-
der it impossible for him to pay the premium, it does not 
·render payment wholly impossible, because it may be paid 
by others for him. Sickness or insanity of the insured is 
not consideredto be such an act of God as will excuse fail-
ure to make prompt payment of premiums. 
"Now if insanity does not excuse the failure to pay pre-
miums, then there can be no good reason why it should ex-
cuse the failure to furnish proof of disability. It is the 
proof of disability that excuses the failure to pay the pre-
miums. The very purpose of disability insurance is to pro-
vide an income during such disability, not to accumulate a 
fund for the benefit of a third party beneficiary. Such dis-
ability includes insanity and other forms of mental incompe-
tency. Hence, when the insured takes out such insurance, 
he is called upon to make provision, as he easily may and 
usually does, for a contingency that may render him unable, 
personally, to make proof. There are very potent reasons 
why this should be the rule. If the time for making proof 
be not confined to the period during which the policy is in 
force, then the beneficiary may wait until the insured has 
died and afterwards claim that the disability took place 
years before. The insured would thus be put in a position 
where it would be almost impossible to make an investiga-
tion of the true facts of the situation. The practical effect 
would be that an insurance company woufd be compelled to 
carry every lapsed or forfeited policy as a contingent liabil-
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ity until after the death of the insured. AU actuarial com-
putations would thus be upset, and the amount of proper 
reserves could never be determined. We, therefore, must 
hold that the incapacity of the insured furnished no excuse 
for the failure to make due proof during the time that the 
policy was kept in force by the payment of premiums." 
This was also the holding by the New Jersey court, 
March 26, 1934, in Coleman vs. New York Life Ins. Co., 171 
Atl., page 541. 
Based upon these decisions counsel for plaintiff in error 
respectfully submit that the judgment of the Circuit Court 
of Henry County overruling the demurrer to the evidence 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully, 
THE METROPOLITAN LIFE lNSURANdE COMPANY 
By Counsel: 
GRASTY CREWS, 
HARRIS, HARVEY & BROWN, 
Counsel. 
